Bibliography and Sources

Primary Sources

Imperial War Museum, London
Scrapbooks entitled ‘Ministry of Information’, kept by E. Embleton, 1939- 1946, containing various newspaper clippings (many unsourced and undated).

Collection of newspaper cuttings entitled ‘ATS Glamour Girl, History 1939-85′ by Abram Games OBE, RDI.

Selection of original posters

Mass Observation Archives, University of Sussex
Change No. 2, Home Propaganda for The Advertising Services Guild, [1942]

FR 1, ‘Channels of Publicity’, 11/10/39

FR 2, ‘Government Posters in Wartime’, October 1939

FR 74, ‘Grab, Grab, Grab’ poster, 16/04/40

FR 442, ‘Be Like Dad, Keep Mum’ slogan, October 1940

FR 800, ‘Gas mask posters’, 21/07/41

FR 853, ‘The Technique of Gallup Polls’, 30/08/41

FR 1020, ‘Reviews of Home Propaganda by M-O: from Art and Industry, Vol. 32′, January 1942

FR 2442, Directive and Bulletin: New Series No 4, Merry and Black: reactions to the ‘Black Widow’ poster on road safety, December 1946

TC, Posters: Box 1 ‘Government Poster Survey 1939′

	File A:	‘Memos and Comments’ September – November 1939
	File C:	‘Government posters in wartime’ October 1939
	File E:	‘Extra information post-survey’ 1939-1940

Box 2: ‘Surveys of particular Government posters 1939-1941′

	File B:	‘Keep it Dark’ poster survey’ October 1939
	File C:	‘Anti-gossip posters’ 1939-1940
	File D:	‘Grab, Grab, Grab poster’ April 1940
	File E:	‘Gas mask posters’ August 1941
	File G:	‘Miscellaneous’ 1941

Box 4: ‘Various poster surveys: Government and Commercial’ 1939-1943

	File A:	‘Poster survey’ 1939-1943
	File C:	‘Red Army poster’ August 1941

Selection of original posters

Public Record Office, Kew (Now The National Archives)
Ministry of Information
INF 1/ Ministry of Information Files of Correspondence

INF 2/ Guard Books and Related Unregistered Papers

INF 3/ Ministry of Information Original Art Work

INF 13/ Posters and Publications (Selection)

Ministry of Agriculture
MAF 59/ Woman’s Land Army

Secondary Sources

Addison, P. The Road to 1945 (Quartet, London) 1975

Balfour, M. Propaganda in the War 1939-45, Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) 1979

Begley, G. Keep Mum: Advertising Goes to War (Lemon Tree Press, London) 1975

Bell, P.M.H. John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Politics and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 (Edward Arnold, London) 1990

Boehm, E. Behind Enemy Lines: WWII Allied/Axis Propaganda (Wellfleet, New Jersey) 1989

Briggs, A. The War of Words: A History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom Vol. 3 (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 1970

Briggs, S. Keep Smiling Through (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London) 1975

Brown, J.A.C. Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing (Penguin, Middlesex) 1963

Calder, A .The People’s War 1939-1945 (Pimlico, London) 1969

Calder, A. and Sheridan, D. Speak for Yourself: A Mass-Observation Anthology 1937-49 (Jonathan Cape, London) 1984

Campbell, J. (ed) The Experience of World War Two (Grange Books, London) 1994

Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45 (HMSO, London) 1989

——- The Second World War: A Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (HMSO, London) 1993

Catterall, P Britain 1918-1951 ( Heinemann, Oxford) 1994

Chamberlin, E.R. Life in Wartime Britain (B.T. Batsford, London) 1972

Collier, P.F. Collier’s Encyclopaedia (CDRom) 1996

Costello, J. Love, Sex and War 1939-1945 (Pan Books, London) 1985

Darracott, J. and Loftus, B. (Imperial War Museum) Second World War Posters (HMSO, London) 1972

Davies, J. The Wartime Kitchen and Garden: The Home Front 1939-45 (BBC, London) 1993

Dear, I.C.B. The Oxford Companion to the Second World War (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 1995

Felton, M. Civilian Supplies in Wartime Britain (Ministry of Information, England) 1945 (Reprinted 1997 by Imperial War Museum)

Fowler, S. ‘The Nation’s Memory’ in Martin, A.M. (ed) Despatches: the Magazine of the Friends of the Imperial War Museum, April 1997, pp4-7

Fougasse A School of Purposes: Fougasse Posters, 1939-45 (Methuen, London) 1946

Freeman, R.A. Britain at War (Arms and Armour Press, London) 1990

Funk and Wagnalls Corporation Microsoft Encarta Encyclopaedia (CDRom) 1995

Gallup, G.H. The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain 1937-1975 Vol. 1: 1937-1964 (Random House, New York) 1976

Gaskell, I. ‘History of Images’ in Burke, P. (ed) New Perspectives on Historical Writing (Polity Press, Cambridge) 1991

Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Nationalising Femininity: Culture, sexuality and British cinema in the Second World War (Manchester University Press, Manchester) 1996

Gubar, S. ‘”This Is My Rifle, This Is My Gun”: World War Two and the Blitz on Women’ in Higonnet, M.R., Jenson, J., Michel, S. and Weitz, M.C. (eds) Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars (Yale University Press, London) 1987

Harper, P. War, Revolution and Peace, Propaganda Posters from the Hoover Institution Archives 1914-1945 [Stanford Art Department, Stanford Museum] [1969]

Harrisson, T. Living Through the Blitz (Penguin, Hammondsworth) 1976

Haskell, F. History and its Images: Art and the Interpretation of the Past (Yale University Press, London) 1993

Hillier, B. Posters (Spring Books, London) 1969

H.M.S.O. Persuading the People (HMSO, London) 1995

Hollis, R. Graphic Design: A Concise History (Thames and Hudson, London) 1994

Howlett, P. Fighting with Figures: A statistical digest of the Second World War (HMSO, London) 1995

Hunt, J. and Watson, S. Britain and the Two World Wars (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 1990

Jowett, G. and O’Donnell, V. Propaganda and Persuasion (Sage, London) 1987

Kostelanetz, R. (ed) Moholy-Nagy (Allen Lane, London) 1970

Kress, G. and Van Leeuwen, T. Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design (Routledge, London) 1996

INDEX The Spirit of Wartime (Orbis, Kettering) 1995

Lant, A. Blackout: Reinventing Women for Wartime British Cinema (Princeton University Press, Oxford) 1991

Lewis, P. A People’s War (Thames Methuen, London) 1986

Lissitsky, K. El Lissitsky (Thames and Hudson, London) 1968

Longmate, N. How We Lived Then (Arrow Books, London) 1977

Lysaght, C.E. Brendan Bracken (Allen Lane, London) 1979

Marshall Cavendish Collection, ‘Selling the War’ in Images of War No.64 (Marshall Cavendish, London) 1996

Marwick, A. The Nature of History (MacMillan, Basingstoke) 1989

McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two (George Allen and Unwin, London) 1979

McQuiston, L. Graphic Agitation (Phaidon Press, London) 1993

Meggs, P.B. Type and Image: The Language of Graphic Design (Von Nostrand Reinhold, London) 1989

Mercer, D. (ed.) Chronicle of the Second World War (Longman, Harlow) 1990

Nelson, D. The Posters that won the war: The Production, Recruitment and War Bond Posters of World War II (Motorbooks, Wisconsin) 1991

Opie, R. The Wartime Scrapbook: from Blitz to Victory (New Cavendish Books, London) 1995

Paret, P., Lewis, B.I., and Paret, P. Persuasive Images: Posters of War and Revolution (Princeton University Press, New Jersey) 1992

Pearce, M. and Stewart, G. British Political History 1867-1990 (Routledge, London) 1992

Pope, R. War and Society in Britain (Longman, London) 1991

Richards, J. and Sheridan, D. (eds) Mass-Observation at the Movies (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) 1987

Rickards, M. The Rise and Fall of the Poster (David and Charles, Newton Abbot) 1971

Samuel, R. (ed) Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity, Vol. III: National Fictions (Routledge, London) 1989

Smith, M. British Politics, Society and State Since the Late Nineteenth Century (MacMillan, Basingstoke) 1990

Stevenson, J. British Society 1914-45 (Penguin, London) 1984

Taylor, P.M. The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 1981

Thompson, P. and Davenport, P. The Dictionary of Visual Language (Bogstom & Boyle Books, Ltd., London) 1980

Tinkler, P. Constructing Girlhood: Popular Magazines for Girls Growing up in England 1920-1950 (Taylor and Francis, London) 1995

Weight, R. ‘State, Intelligentsia and the Promotion of National Culture in Britain, 1939-45′, Historical Research, Vol. 69, No. 168, February 1996, pp83-101

Weill, A. The Poster (Sotheby’s, London) 1985

Willett, J. The Weimar Years: a culture cut short (Thames and Hudson, London) 1984

Zemen, Z. Selling the War: Art and Propaganda in World War II (Orbis, London) 1978

If you wish to cite from this page, please use the following citation:

Lewis, R.M., ‘Bibliography & Sources, Undergraduate Thesis: The planning, design and reception of British home front propaganda posters of the Second World War’, <URL>, written April 1997, accessed Enter Date Here

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Forward/Back to Contents

Conclusion

This study of the administrative context, content, and reception of these posters allows us to make a number of conclusions on the issue of World War II propaganda. These relate to the way that the government appeared not to have learnt any lessons from the First World War, although over the course of the war appeared to learn from its own failures. The government learnt to listen to the people, although they still seemed to be rather over-optimistic about how much posters could achieve.

When the MoI was set up, it appears to have been regarded as very unimportant by many of those in a position to influence it, although this seems to have changed later when attempts were made to recall advertising experts. The MoI seemed largely to model itself upon First World War experiences, with little regard for the cultural changes in the intervening twenty years, partly because there had been no MoI in those years. After the First World War, the MoI had been disbanded far too quickly, and it appears that the government intended to repeat this mistake as ministers, including Bracken, did not seem to appreciate the range of roles that the MoI could encompass.

It remains difficult to generalise about government posters as a large number were produced. For instance, initially, the MoI appeared to rely largely upon dull and wordy First World War examples, but soon seemed to realise that these were not appropriate for the Second World War. However, one cannot say that the MoI did not produce purely ‘word’ posters after the first failures, as it is possible that these simply did not survive as people did not think them worth saving.

From the start of the war the MoI had to decide “whether to exhort the population to take the action desired by the Government or to focus publicity on explaining and backing up government measures” [Footnote 1]. To begin with, exhortation was the preferred method, but it was realised that “exhortations are useless without commands; commands are useless without organisation” [Footnote 2] and such methods had largely been abandoned by July 1940 [Footnote 3].

An impression which is echoed in a contemporary Fougasse cartoon (Figure 63) is that

In the absence of a smoothly functioning intelligence division the Ministry adopted the blunderbuss technique of domestic propaganda, firing as much material as possible in the hope of hitting something [Footnote 4].

The cartoon, reproduced in a newspaper article, complained that one could not tell what the government wished the people to do, as one could not tell the essential instructions from the peripheral, less urgent, campaigns. Peace-time department stores usually devoted its entire advertising to a single sales message, “It did not confuse the issue by including … exhortations to buy the wares of a dozen different other departments.” [Footnote 5]

M-O suggested that government campaigns might have been more successful:

	a)	if there weren’t so many of them – if you could tell the wood from the trees, the should from the must;
	b)	if similar kinds were clearly and intelligently related to the whole plan;
	c)	if there was less pleading, more leading;
	d)	If the background to needs and resistances were pre-studied and post-checked more factually and dealt with on a sounder psychology. [Footnote 6]

The war had prompted a “thorough examination among the nations elites of what constituted British national identity” [Footnote 7]. It was recognised that new techniques needed to be adopted to increase the effectiveness of propaganda, and the government went to considerable expense to set up, and maintain, the Home Intelligence Division, to discover whether posters would be effective, and if so, how to target them better. The government appeared to recognise, if rather belatedly, the importance of providing accurate information to the people, realising that if people understood the reasons for restrictions, they were far more likely to accept them.

Although we have gained an impression of a government that was out of touch with its people, we have to bear in mind that the large majority of sources available about reactions to posters were designed to provide constructive criticism, and were not really concerned with praising any posters. As such, we cannot really gain a balanced view on the success of government posters.

The very fact that so many posters were needed, aside from the other means by which campaigns were disseminated, begging people to do various activities, is indicative of a lack of ‘pulling together’. However, we need to note that the Government did not appear to feel the need to legislate; persuasion was perceived to be enough. The Emergency Powers Act of 22 May 1944 allowed the government unlimited power over its citizens, but it appears that they chose not to use such power [Footnote 8]. Although the State had more involvement with the people than ever before, there was felt a need to be careful as it was claiming to fight a war on behalf of democracy, against totalitarianism, and could not appear to be totalitarian.

When planning a post-war campaign, criticisms were made about the use the government had made of propaganda in the war:

propaganda can operate efficiently only as part of a balanced plan … its real function lies in speeding up and supporting organised effort, focusing on a particular target … It performs the ‘softening up’ process without which other action would be less effective [Footnote 9].

It appeared that the government expected far more from propaganda than propaganda was able to deliver, and that:

the attempt to use propaganda as an easy way of avoiding legislation is a waste of energy, time and money: the role of propaganda more properly being that of explaining to the public the reason for legislation and their part in the altered situation [Footnote 10].

Whilst art historians look for the aesthetic merits in art, the historian looks upon it’s historical merits [Footnote 11] . Posters are culturally relative, they give us an idea of the problems that the government faced in World War Two, and how it dealt with them. Posters could be considered to have exaggerated importance as copies are so easily obtainable, unlike radio broadcasts, where the general public would have to go to great lengths to hear one. Posters are regarded as accessible art by many, but are seen, in art history terms, as poor quality and therefore undeserved of study. However, poster images can be seen as a reflection of the government’s hopes and fears about the wartime population, and in this study we have looked behind the images at these worries. If an image recurred over time, we could assume that such an image appeared to produced the required action.

There is much more that could be done with this subject, including further case studies into areas such as the use of humour, which has been touched upon, or the characterisation of inanimate objects such as potatoes and bombs. It is also conceivable that, through a study of the surrounding legislation, it would be possible to date further posters, and to understand to what extent the government relied solely upon encouragement, or used posters to back up legislation. Further study into the extent to which posters were used nationally or locally would also help us to understand whether the government was in touch with its people. However, within these limitations, this study has uncovered and analysed a number of key features of World War II propaganda.

Footnotes:

1. H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995, p17
2. Report of Planning Committee on a Home Morale Campaign, undated, PRO, INF 1/533
3. Hunt, J. and Watson, S. Britain and the Two World Wars, 1990, p122
4. McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, p54
5. Unidentified, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum
6. M-O A: Change No. 2, Home Propaganda for The Advertising Services Guild, [1942], p16
7. Weight, R. ‘State, Intelligentsia and the Promotion of National Culture in Britain, 1939-45′, Historical Research Vol. 69, No. 168, February 1996, p83
8. Pearce, M. and Stewart, G. British Political History 1867-1990, 1992, p427
9. Road Safety Committee: Notes on Propaganda (RSC (44) 58) for Propaganda Sub Committee, [February 1944], PRO, INF 1/687, p1
10. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p253
11. Gaskell, I. ‘History of Images’ in Burke, P. (ed) New Perspectives on Historical Writing, 1991, p188

If you wish to cite from this page, please use the following citation:

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Case Study: Gendered Images

In a post-feminist age, one could argue that there should also be a chapter devoted to the way that men were depicted and appealed to in posters, but these are generally not relevant to the Home Front, with most posters aimed at men designed to get them to enlist in the services. With the war no longer fought in faraway territories, women were involved firsthand in warfare for the first time. The Government tried to appeal to women in many different ways in their posters.

During the war women encountered impossibly incompatible representations of themselves: from being inessential to national identity, to being central to it, to threatening to it; from being patient wives to mobile women; from being painted ladies to military beauties [Footnote 1].

The ideas of the First World War still held sway in some ways, as through the 1920s and 1930s the woman’s expected place was still the home, although there had been growing acceptance that there were roles for women in the workplace. It was not until there was a need for employed men in the armed forces that women were actually appealed to in the armed support services, or in the factories. The majority of posters still relied upon images of women that emphasised their domestic, passive, maternal, and supportive roles, images that relied upon – and were rooted in – the orthodoxies of contemporary gender relations. We see the growing use of such phrases as ‘The Kitchen Front’, designed to make the woman feel that she was ‘doing her bit’ in the home.

In America, women were encouraged to join the services by a campaign on the theme ‘Release a Man for Combat’, which backfired as it “drew attention to the fact that if wives and girlfriends enlisted they might be sending their own or someone else’s loved one to risk death at the battlefront” [Footnote 2]. M-O claimed that in Britain, the effect was the opposite, as a poster with an illustration of a soldier, captioned ‘IF ONLY MORE WOMEN WOULD HELP’, was successful in increasing the pressure upon women to do war work, although it was only successful because it was well timed, unlike “Many government campaigns [which] attempted to operate in a pressure-less vacuum.” [Footnote 3] After 2 December, 1941, when conscription for women was introduced, posters were more concerned with the choice between occupations for women, rather than trying to persuade them to work at all.

The government faced a dilemma after the mobilisation of women as it was necessary to represent women as patriotic, both in the home, and in the workplace. Although a lack of workers meant that women were necessary in the factories, it was also wished that the war would not interfere with normal domestic arrangements, but “producers of official propaganda dodged this dilemma by separating the woman worker and the housewife” [Footnote 4]. The young, single woman was concentrated upon as the ideal recruit for work, pictured in model patriotic roles (Figure 42), whilst mothers and housewives were shown in domestic settings, wearing frilly pinafores (Figure 43), urged to ‘Make-do- and-Mend’ as their patriotic duty [Footnote 5]. Posters tended to ignore the fact that many women fitted into both spheres.

Posters needed not only to make jobs appear attractive to women, but enable them to identify with the images contained in the posters. Existing members of the ATS and Thelma Cazalet criticised Abram Game’s ‘ATS’ poster (Figure 44) for over-emphasising the glamour of service life, and it was a consequently withdrawn for being ‘too glamorous’, replaced with a photo of a serving ATS member (Figure 45), which was believed to lend an air of authenticity to the poster. The withdrawal of the poster suggests that the government felt that the glamorised images would not attract real women, although an MoI official claimed that the poster was not aimed at attracting glamorous girls, and couldn’t understand the objection to an A.T.S. girl being shown as smart and attractive. “One would think from this type of criticism that every effort should be made to show that the service was for the most unattractive and un-enterprising women!” [Footnote 6]

The practice of using idealistic images obviously presented problems for some, such as the farmers who had workers turn up to ‘Lend a Hand on the Land’ (Figure 46) in their summer holidays: “Girls turned up dressed as for a picnic and were incapacitated in a matter of hours.” [Footnote 7] Idyllic images of the countryside translated into smelly and hard work. The Woman’s Land Army were similarly idealistic (Figure 47), presenting a far more glamorous and clean picture than the reality. It was not only in the countryside that the realities were mis-represented. Factory workers were liable to find their machines taken over for the morning by a troop of glamorous women in ministry-approved war worker outfits, who performed for the benefit of the cameras and were subsequently used to illustrate the mobilisation of women. [Footnote 8]

Allied propaganda spoke directly about and to the servicemen’s fear of betrayal. Posters enjoining silence as a protection against spies implied that women’s talk would kill fighting men. Women are pictured as “irresponsible in their garrulity” (Figure 24), and as “sinister in their silence” (Figure 48) [Footnote 9]. It was felt to be very important to make people realise their responsibility as

the anti-gossip campaign will never be as effective as it should be unless everyone in the country realises that it is not necessary to be an out-and-out ‘long-tongued babbling gossip’ to be, potentially, one of the silly asses in the cartoons, jabbering away in public places. [Footnote 10]

Fougasse was felt to be very effective as “his victims laugh even while they see themselves as Fougasse sees them” [Footnote 11]. (Figures 18 and 24)

The most famous poster of the ‘Keep mum, she’s not so dumb!’ series, designed for the officers’ messes, contained a beautiful woman known as ‘Olga’ (Figure 48), although there were others produced aimed at lower ranks ( Figures 49 , 50 & 51 ), with the slogan used in other national campaigns. ‘Olga’ is presented as a ‘femme fatale’, a glamorous vamp, a spy whose charms will endanger national security. It is an idea that is repeated in ‘Don’t tell Aunty and Uncle’ ( Figure 52 ), with a young, apparently naked woman, evidently intent on gaining information, and again in A maiden loved; an idle word; a comrade lost; and Adolf served ( Figure 53 ) praised as presenting a “complete story in twelve words, full of pep and punch and straight to the point” [Footnote 12]. Such an image popular in many countries, although Lant claims that such images were really only used in Britain before it was realised what a shortage of “manpower” there was going to be [Footnote 13].

Dr Edith Summerskill complained that the ‘Keep Mum, She’s not so dumb’ series was degrading to women as housework should be deemed to be an economic contribution to family life [Footnote 14]. Indeed, M-O found that the posters did not really appeal to women, as most did not feel (consciously) that they were being kept, and were “unable to think of themselves in a situation where they would ‘BE LIKE DAD’”, although women were more commonly felt to be stimulated by joke appeals [Footnote 15]. M-O found that the pun in the slogan was lost upon many in the working class, whilst those in the middle classes felt that the slogan was undignified, and most did not call their parents ‘Dad’ and ‘Mum’ anyway [Footnote 16]. M-O felt that the dis-illusionment with government campaigns and slogans in general which followed the failed ‘Silent Column’ ( Figure 54 ) had also lent an antagonistic effect to any new campaign dealing with the issue of careless talk [Footnote 17].

Women were seen as danger as they could infect fighting men with venereal disease (VD). Reginald Mount’s “Hello boy friend, coming my way” ( Figure 55 ) shows the feminine allure of the veiled hat and the ‘vaginal flower’ which would “lure soldiers to dissolution and death”, signified by the skull of the woman [Footnote 18]. Note that virginal fictional heroines also wore such hats, and that it was the text ‘the easy girl-friend’ that lent the ‘sensual connotations’ [Footnote 19]. Its effect upon the innocent bride ( Figure 56 ) was designed to make men feel guilty about their free and easy ways, whilst women were made to feel guilty about the effect that VD could have upon their children ( Figure 57 ).

The very fact that posters about VD could be put up is significant as although it was recognised that war led to an increase in VD, the British government generally tried to avoid the issue, with the 1916 Venereal Diseases Act, which made it slander to imply that anyone was infected with VD, still in force [Footnote 20]. However the VD rates hit such epidemic proportions that in October 1942 a campaign was finally begun [Footnote 21]; its purpose to make the public aware of the symptoms of the disease, and the treatment available. It had been feared that the public would be squeamish about such issues, but a survey revealed that ninety per-cent of the public approved of the posters that were designed to shock [Footnote 22], and we have to take into account the fact that between the wars, advertising about bodily functions had become a normal occurrence.

Kirkham argued that there “was no ‘masculinisation’ of women’s body shape” [Footnote 23] during the war, and that the ‘New Look’, with the small waist, and an emphasis upon the bust, associated with post-war fashion, was also fashionable in war-time, when it was seen as part of the female duty to remain feminine: “beauty as duty … conveyed something of the stiff upper lip associated with the British upper classes” [Footnote 24]. Consider the difference between Figure 58 and 59 , where the first picture appears to have been rejected due to the masculine appearance of the woman. With the government attempting to persuade women to wear their hair in certain ways, in posters, hair styles are presented only as those which were the most sensible ( Figure 60 ). Generally only those in a fully domestic situation, or one of the glamorous spies mentioned, would be shown with long hair [Footnote 25].

Figure 61 was rejected, and it was suggested that this poster would have deterred mothers from handing their children over [Footnote 26], although IWM PST 0137, containing a very similar picture was accepted for publication. Both posters were entitled ‘Caring for evacuees is a national service’ and although there was legislation in place to make people become hosts to evacuees, this was generally regarded as unsatisfactory, and so it was left to volunteers, and to the discretion of billeting officers [Footnote 27]. In Figure 62 we get an impression of evacuation as a happy, healthy experience, in the joyous countryside with happy, willing hosts.

Having looked at all three case studies, we can see whether the government really did consider, and use, propaganda, specifically posters, as the fourth armament.

Footnotes:

1. Lant, A. ‘Prologue: Mobile Femininity’ in Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Nationalising Femininity: Culture, sexuality and British cinema in the Second World War, 1996, p19
2. Costello, J. Love, Sex and War 1939-1945, 1985, p70
3. M-O A: Change No. 2, Home Propaganda for The Advertising Services Guild, [1942], p13
4. Summerfield, P. ”The girl that makes the thing that drills the hole that holds the spring… ‘: discourses of women and work in the Second World War’ in Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Op. Cit., p40
5. Ibid.
6. Quoted in World’s Press News, 30/10/41, from a collection of newspaper cuttings entitled ‘ATS Glamour Girl, History 1939-85′ by Abram Games OBE, RDI, held at the IWM
7. Chamberlin, E.R. Life in Wartime Britain, 1972, p129
8. Calder, A .The People’s War 1939-1945, 1969, p501
9. Gubar, S. ‘”This Is My Rifle, This Is My Gun”: World War Two and the Blitz on Women’ in Higonnet, M.R., Jenson, J., Michel, S. and Weitz, M.C. (eds) Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars, 1987, p240
10. M-O A : TC Posters, 3/C, Times, 7/2/40, p9
11. Ibid.
12. Daily Mail, 7/2/40, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum
13. Lant, A. Blackout: Reinventing Women for Wartime British Cinema, 1991, p76 (emphasis in original)
14. Unidentified, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum
15. M-O A: FR 442 ‘Slogan: ‘Be Like Dad, Keep Mum’ – Pilot survey’, October 1940, p6
16. Ibid., p5
17. Ibid., p4
18. Gubar, S. Op. Cit., p240
19. Kirkham, P. ‘Fashioning the feminine: dress, appearance and femininity in wartime’ in Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Op. Cit., p170
20. Costello, J. Op. Cit., p328
21. Ibid., p127
22. Ibid., p130
23. Kirkham, P. Op. Cit., p155
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p164
26. H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995, facing p76
27. Chamberlin, E.R. Op. Cit., p149
28. H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995, p17

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Case Study: The Direct Appeal

M-O claimed that we can divide official propaganda into two main types, the first of which involved appeals for direct action, dealing with practicalities, which would have an immediate effect, such as giving up a saucepan for salvage. The second type was more hypothetical, such as gas mask campaigns, where it would not make any immediate difference to the citizen whether he/she carried his/her gas mask, but would simply be preparing him/her for the coming crises. [Footnote 1]

Unlike in the First World War, when the government had felt that those at home should not ask questions, as they had not truly been involved, in the Second World War, with ‘total war’, the entire population was fully involved. The population needed to be made aware that their actions had direct consequences upon the war effort, and consequently needed far more understanding of government policies; as warfare became more technologically advanced, the armed forces depended proportionately upon the organisational and industrial efforts of those at home. The role of the civilian was crucial in such a conflict, and they were “exhorted to think of themselves as front-line troops” [Footnote 2]. There was

a vivid awareness that the serviceman was a citizen in uniform and the civilian … was perforce another kind of fighter. The list of reserved occupations made explicit what was implicit: in cold military terms the man who made the gun was as vital as the man who fired it [Footnote 3]. ( Figure 31 )

We saw some examples in the last chapter of the relationship between the soldier and the worker, and we can also see in the ‘Dig on for Victory’ poster ( Figure 32 ) the cheerful English worker represented in a soldierly stance, with a pitchfork held in the style of a rifle.

In 1914, the best known British poster of the First World War, Lord Kitchener declaring that ‘Your Country Needs You’, ( Figure 1 ) was produced; “From ten thousand hoardings the compelling finger of Kitchener pointed straight to the passer-by. There was no escaping it.” [Footnote 4] It was much imitated, and later “the public figure directly addressing the viewer became a significant device” [Footnote 5]. The development of this direct appeal was important. It meant that the passer-by would feel that he/she was personally involved in any appeal as the poster would engage directly with his/her eyes [Footnote 6].

One of the most obvious copies of the Kitchener style is Bert Thomas’ ‘Is Your Journey Really Necessary?’, ( Figure 33 ) produced by the Railway Executive Committee, making use of an ordinary soldier, who could be anyone’s brother or friend, rather than an illustration of someone in authority. This appears to have become a characteristic of Second World War posters, with the people asking each other to help out, rather than those in charge asking, or producing guilt feelings, although Churchill adopted the Kitchener stance in Figure 34 which challenged people to ‘Deserve Victory’.

An M-O report claimed there was a difference between ‘You’ and ‘Your’; ‘You’ was directed at the viewer and required action, whilst ‘Your’ did not provide any stimulation to improve [Footnote 7]. For instance, a campaign with the slogan ‘COUGHS AND SNEEZES SPREAD DISEASES. TRAP THE GERMS BY USING YOUR HANDKERCHIEF’ ( Figure 35 ), which although raising awareness of colds and ‘flu, did not “produce appreciable action” as people looked to the posters as ways of avoiding colds themselves, rather than the need to avoid giving colds to other people [Footnote 8].

Another instance when people felt that the message did not apply to themselves was on the August Bank Holiday, 1941. The government had asked people to stay put, and whilst most people felt that it was reasonable for the government to do so, they did not feel that the request imposed any duty upon themselves to do anything about it, consequently record numbers of people took the trains away that day, claiming that if it was essential that they stayed at home, the government would have done more than request [Footnote 9], as there is “no need to plead when you can convince” [Footnote 10]. The campaign was felt to be a waste as the government worked against its own publicity by laying on extra trains [Footnote 11]. M-O summed up a proper propaganda technique as: “The need, plus the need understood, plus instruction, simply stated, equals results.” [Footnote 12]

In many salvage posters we can see the direct effect of contributing salvage, although Figure 36 , along with many other such posters, appears to over-do what could be done with people’s salvage, as three small piles of salvage become shining piles of armoury, when much of the salvage that was collected was not really economical. A particularly first-class example which demonstrated how ordinary objects could contribute to the war effort is a poster by Fougasse ( Figure 37 ), which show various objects of rubbish turning into useful military objects.

Fougasse believed that posters should not be too direct, that they should leave something to the viewer to decide, and so flatter their imagination; he believed that they would remember the message better as they had taken part in decoding the message [Footnote 13]. He used ‘formula figures’ as he felt that photos depicted only one person, whilst he believed that everyone could see themselves in his illustrations [Footnote 14]. Fougasse believed that the use of humour was important as realism states a fact “if you do this it leads to that”, whereas humour suggested that if you “behave like this…”. He felt that realism often bordered on horror, and did not induce people to look at a poster more than once [Footnote 15]. Compare this with the Norman Wilkinson poster ‘A FEW CARELESS WORDS MAY END IN THIS’, ( Figure 38 ) where a graphic realistic picture showed the direct consequence of discussing troop movements.

Another dramatic depiction of the direct effect is ‘They Talked… this happened’ series ( Figures 39 , 40 & 41 ) where one can see the result of a few thoughtless words in the bottom half of each poster, where, in a misty atmosphere, a sombre image of wrecked military equipment is presented.

Having looked at several of the ways in which the government stressed the peoples’ role generally, we will now look specifically at some of the ways in which they used images of, and appealed to, women.

Footnotes:

1. M-O A: Change No. 2, Home Propaganda for The Advertising Services Guild, [1942], p6
2. McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, p2
3. Chamberlin, E.R. Life in Wartime Britain, 1972, p120
4. Daily Mail, 7/2/40, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the IWM
5. Hollis, R. Graphic Design: A Concise History, 1994, p34
6. See Kress, G. and Van Leeuwen, T. Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design, 1996, pp122-3 for more details on the mechanics involved in this strategy.
7. M-O A: TC Posters 1/A, T.H. and G.B. ‘War Posters: Difference between You and Your’, 6/10/39
8. M-O A: Change No. 2, Op. Cit., p14
9. Ibid., p61
10. Ibid., p66
11. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p254
12. M-O A: Change No. 2, Op. Cit., p66
13. Fougasse A School of Purposes: Fougasse Posters, 1939-45, 1946, p30
14. Ibid., 1946, p35
15. Ibid., p38

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Back to International Relations
Forward to Images for, and of, Women

Case Study: International Relations

A major difference between posters of the World Wars is that unlike in the First World War, in the Second World War it “was no longer possible to stir patriotic blood by large references to King and Country”, [Footnote 1] neither was xenophobia rampant. The Germans were no longer depicted as the evil Hun as improved travel and communications meant that many realised that Germans were normal human beings. When war broke out, it was less than twenty years after the previous conflict, and many had believed that all nations involved in it would wish to avoid such a disastrous war again, believing that even the Germans would not wish to get involved again, although they had been visibly re-arming.

The government made attempts to distinguish between Nazis and Germans; people were told that it was a war of ideas, that the “enemy’s recourse to war does not represent the will of the people, but rather reflects the obsessions of misguided leaders”[Footnote 2]. Hitler, consequently, appears to have become the symbol for Germany: he was easy to depict, recognisable simply by a flopped fringe and a black moustache (Figure 17). Fougasse’s cartoon pictures of Hitler and Goering in all places “perhaps tended to convey the impression that the Germans were omniscient, ubiquitous and so omnipotent”[Footnote 3], but they became so well known, that in one poster they are recognisable simply by their uniformed legs (Figure 18).

It was felt that propaganda “should emphasise that our ideals are superior to Nazis’ aims … To harp on villainy only, misses the point and makes for complacency.” [Footnote 4] The use “of atrocity stories … only make the nervous more nervous … [and] we all suspect that the Germans can and are producing similar stories for their own people”[Footnote 5]. It was believed that there was a need to

continually remind people that Hitler’s method is to lull them with promises of relative security and then to destroy them when weakened … this negative horror at the idea of German rule must be supplemented by pride in our own country. [Footnote 6]

as feelings had been aired that people would be better off under the Germans, and that a truce would save much loss of life. This doubtless was what led to the production of the ‘Grab, Grab, Grab’ poster ( Figure 19 ) which was to “convince people of Germany’s aggressive attentions, and to arouse the determination to resist” [Footnote 7]. M-O felt that this poster was a failure as people did not need any further proof of Hitler’s aggressive intentions, and indeed raised a “reluctant admiration for Hitler’s capabilities and concrete achievements” [Footnote 8].

‘Two Cheers for Socialism 1940-1942′, a chapter in Addison’s The Road to 1945 [Footnote 9], describes the struggle that the government had, after the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941, in trying to combine support for the USSR as a war-partner, whilst avoiding the popularisation of Communism. [Footnote 10] Churchill, in particular, was totally anti-Communist and banned the ‘Internationale’ until it was realised that the Soviets were playing ‘God Save the King’ at every conceivable opportunity. [Footnote 11] A M-O survey into a Communist poster ( Figure 20 ), produced soon after the USSR entered the war, encountered differing reactions, with many enthusiastic about their new ally. Yet, many others had reservations about the past behaviour of both the USSR, with its previous alliance with Germany, and the British Communist Party, which had previously been completely against the war, and were concerned that the USSR planned to take over Britain at the end of the war. [Footnote 12] Pro-Russian feeling was generally recognised as high in the country, and Anglo-Soviet publicity was consequently produced, but only in order to steal the thunder of the left [Footnote 13], with relations built up between the Soviet Embassy and the MoI in order to prevent a flow of information to British Communists. [Footnote 14]

It was emphasised that Russians were fighting for their homeland, not for Communism as

Inasmuch as he is for the creation of certain attitudes, the propagandist is necessarily against others; and the extirpation of what he regards as false beliefs and doctrines is as much his concern as the propagation of the ‘right’ ones. [Footnote 15]

Points of common interest were to be referred to, not differences. [Footnote 16] Russians were no more to be referred to as Communists than Britons were to be referred to as Capitalists. Bolshevism was accepted only as superior to Nazism, and it was stressed that “We need not tell the public again that as Hitler had his Gestapo so Stalin has his Ogpu. But we need never let him forget it” [Footnote 17]. Propaganda aimed at the working class was to dwell on the sacrifice of the Russian workers, such as the newspaper advertisement in Figure 21 , and the efficiency of the Russian war machine, whilst propaganda for the middle classes was to stress Russian culture. [Footnote 18]

Some Soviet posters were directly re-printed with captions in English, such as those seen in Figure 22 . The Soviet’s generally depicted Hitler as fairly evil (Figure 23), and one could compare this with British representations of Hitler as a silly, and relatively harmless, little figure, (Figure 24) although this has to be set within the general historical context of a far longer history of German-Russian enmity than of Anglo-German enmity, with the Russians suffering far more at the hands of the Germans.

Other campaigns exhibit a more subtle Soviet influence. The emphasis upon the rule of the proletariat in Communist society led to a glorification of industry in Soviet posters, and, as the government owned the economy, the Soviets were able to concentrate upon campaigns to increase industrial output without worrying about finance. [Footnote 19] The Ministry of Supply produced a poster (Figure 25) showing “a gory Hitler … scurrying away from a concentration of ‘Waltzing Matilda’ tanks with blazing guns” [Footnote 20], with the caption ‘When? it’s up to us’ placing the responsibility for bringing the war to a speedy end squarely with the workers in the factory. With the accent upon the close relation between production and the battle front, the Soviet influence was repeated many times in posters in which the soldier urged the citizen on in his/her duty (Figure 26). [Footnote 21] For the factory workers cartoons superseded ‘superb pictorial reproductions’ as the main propaganda weapons, although action photographs were still to be ‘liberally featured’ [Footnote 22].

In 1941 the Ministry of Labour launched a major campaign, designed to make work in factories look appealing and important, including the poster ‘WOMEN OF BRITAIN, COME INTO THE FACTORIES’ (Figure 27). We can see the influence of Socialist Realism in this poster, in the bright colours which attracted the eye; the statuesque pose of the woman in peasant type clothes, and the slogan, which stressed the heroic nature of factory work; and the background scene a glorification of industry. A more outright pro-Russian appeal was made by a poster which declared ‘COVER YOUR HAIR, YOUR RUSSIAN SISTER DOES’ (Figure 28), which held Soviet women up as “appropriate models for emulation by British women” [Footnote 23].

Allusions to the Japanese largely do not appear to come into Home Front propaganda until the end of the war. The Japanese war was seen as a peripheral activity, something in which the Americans were engaged, rather than the British [Footnote 24]. After VE-Day, on 8 May 1945, the British people had to be reminded that the war would not really be over until the Japanese were defeated (Figure 29).

In relation to its attitude to ethnic minorities within Britain, it could be assumed that Britain was entirely populated by white people, as there do not appear to be any posters which appealed to ethnic communities. Black people had long been held to be at the bottom of the social pile, and to bring them into view as workers alongside white British women “went against the long-held colour bar” [Footnote 25]. Although Hitler was “told off in public for undervaluing black men, the British government was privately doing its best to keep black women out of the forces” [Footnote 26], and the only posters which depicted ethnic minorities are those which appealed to a sense of Empire (Figure 30), and even in this poster there is only two ethnic minorities, and they are relegated to the back rows.

Having seen how the government dealt with the issue of foreign nations, we will look at some of the ways in which it tried to make those at home feel that their contribution to the war was important, knowing that flag-waving would not work any more.

Footnotes:

1. Chamberlin, E.R. Life in Wartime Britain, 1972, p23
2. McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, p20
3. Calder, A .The People’s War 1939-1945, 1969, p136
4. Minute Sheet, 27/5/40, PRO, INF 1/533
5. Ibid.
6. Report of Planning Committee on a Home Morale Campaign, undated, Ibid.
7. M-O A FR 74 ‘Grab, Grab, Grab’ poster, 16/4/40, p1
8. Ibid. p6
9. Addison, P. The Road to 1945, 1975, pp127-163
10. See also Bell, P.M.H. John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Politics and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945, 1990 for a more detailed study of the evolution of government policies.
11. Addison, P. Op. Cit., p134
12. M-O A: TC Posters, 4/C, ‘Red Army Poster’, 8/8/41
13. Very Secret: Letter from R.H. Parker, 10/2/42, PRO, INF 1/677
14. Addison, P. Op. Cit., p135
15. Brown, J.A.C. Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing, 1963, p13 (emphasis in original)
16. Memorandum on possible points in dealing with Russia, undated [July], PRO, INF 1/913
17. Policy towards Communism: Note by Director of Home Division – RHP, Secret, 12/8/41, p3, Ibid.
18. Memorandum on possible points in dealing with Russia, undated [July], Ibid.
19. Weill, A. The Poster, 1985, p295
20. Advertiser’s Weekly, 9/10/41, p27, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum. (Hereafter, Embleton Collection, IWM)
21. Weill, A. Op. Cit., p295
22. Advertiser’s Weekly, 9/10/41, p27, Embleton Collection, IWM
23. Lant, A. Blackout: Reinventing Women for Wartime British Cinema, 1991, p84
24. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p158
25. Jarrett-Macauley, D. ‘Putting the black women in the frame: Una Marson and the West Indian challenge to British national identity’, in Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Nationalising Femininity: Culture, sexuality and British cinema in the Second World War, 1996, p120
26. Ibid., p121

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Forward to The Direct Appeal

The First Posters

In May 1940, a MoI memorandum had stated that “the best available brains should be conscripted at once. Big advertising agencies should be called into conference”. [Footnote 1] Although it was claimed that selling toothpaste involved ‘selling an idea’ as much as official propaganda did, [Footnote 2] M-O felt that not enough new thinking had been done about the different function of official propaganda; [Footnote 3] that established commercial practices were not necessarily suitable. Government propaganda was intended to produce a quicker result than commercial campaigns, which tend to have a slow, gradual impact, and, whilst commercial campaigns are judged to be effective if they achieve any upturn in sales, government campaigns were intended to reach everyone.

Commercial campaigns tend to “involve something new and supposedly useful or pleasant in return for reacting”, whilst official propaganda tended to ask people to make some kind of sacrifice, the benefits of which were not necessarily immediately obvious. [Footnote 4] Commercial propaganda also tends to use ‘polite solicitation’, a technique that was not considered appropriate for government campaigns, when many people felt that if the situation was urgent enough, the government would demand, not ask, that they do something. [Footnote 5]

A more positive difference was that whilst commercial advertisers were required to make the public conscious of, then build up positive attitudes towards, their product in order to achieve sales, the government already had its ‘product’ accepted and consumed. It was felt that the MoI was not taking enough advantage of this, although it was recognised that many people regarded the MoI as suspect. [Footnote 6]

Once it became obvious that war was inevitable, the MoI began making preparations for, amongst other things, the first poster to be produced. The poster was expected to:

i) attract immediate attention and evoke a spontaneous reaction.

ii) exert a steadying influence, i.e. the idea of tenacity and vigour.

iii) incite to action.

iv) harmonise with general preconceived ideas among the public.

v) be short.

vi) be universal in appeal. [Footnote 7]

These aims were very ambitious by any standards, but even at the time there were dissenting voices. Although the “danger of broad humour as a poster medium” [Footnote 8] was emphasised, one of the propagandists, E.M. Nicholson, tried to persuade his colleagues that the British people would respond much more readily to defiant and colloquial humour, rather than the high flown sentiments such as “We are fighting evil things. Against brute force and bad faith. Right will Prevail” [Footnote 9] which they were putting forward. He believed that a stress upon ‘attitude of mind’ was far more important than such solemn declarations, as “the British public were suspicious of lofty sentiment and reasoned argument”. [Footnote 10]

A.P. Ryan felt that “Parliament and Whitehall stand today, in their attitude towards news, publicity, advertising and propaganda, where business stood twenty years ago”. [Footnote 11] When business had accepted the necessity of advertising, it had believed that portraits of managing directors at the head of a letter press, written without regard to the public to which it was intended to appeal, were sufficient. [Footnote 12] The government believed that the working classes would best accept important information from those at the top, but McLaine argues that those in the Ministry were over-occupied with the question of class; rather than asking themselves what they would wish to hear in a given situation, “they proceeded on the assumption that the mass of their fellow citizens would need to be cajoled and wheedled into an acceptance of their obligations”. [Footnote 13] He believed that the emphasis upon good spirits and obedience, and the belief in a need for the oblique shepherding of public opinion, pointed to the Oxbridge background of many of the planners. [Footnote 14]

When war was actually declared the government had to act quickly in order to produce a series of posters and “Of necessity, the wording and design had to be simple, for prompt reproduction and quick absorption.” [Footnote 15] The series were designed to have a corporate identity, with a new and distinctive typeface, which, coincidentally, would make it difficult for the enemy to forge, [Footnote 16] with the only pictorial element a crown. Almost immediately, newspapers complained that the posters were both dull and egregious, [Footnote 17] with one reporter maintaining that although he passed them six times a day, he could not remember the slogan. [Footnote 18]

M-O published a major study into these first posters of war, [Footnote 19] their results tempered by the provisos that it was difficult to analyse such posters as little theory had been done on the topic before; that commercial posters take months or years to have an effect, whilst M-O were trying to measure effects after only a few weeks; that M-O had been unable to collect data prior to the study and so had nothing to compare it with. [Footnote 20]

The poster that has become the most well known of the series was intended to convey a “statement of duty of the individual citizen”. [Footnote 21] The wording for ‘YOUR COURAGE, YOUR RESOLUTION, WILL BRING US VICTORY’. ( Figure 9 ) was put forward by A.P. Waterfield, a career civil servant with no credibility in the field of publishing. [Footnote 22] Much is made of a distinction between ‘You’ and ‘Us’, implying that the people were fighting only for the government, and not for themselves. The MoI had used ‘your’ rather than ‘our’ as they believed that otherwise people would feel that they had a loophole to get out, that other people could cope. [Footnote 23] It is interesting to note is that the MoI had considered some First World War posters, including one with the words ‘THE GERMANS SAID YOU WERE NOT IN EARNEST. WE KNEW YOU’D COME AND GIVE THEM THE LIE’, and it was noted “in any future publicity of a similar nature the implied distinction between You and We … should be carefully avoided.” [Footnote 24]

The other poster proclaimed ‘FREEDOM IS IN PERIL, DEFEND IT WITH ALL YOUR MIGHT’, which even during the planning stages raised the criticism that ‘Freedom’ is rather an abstract concept and was “likely to be too academic and too alien to the British habit of thought”. [Footnote 25] M-O reported that people felt that they could not defend ‘freedom’ because they cannot feel that they are being attacked. [Footnote 26]

Responsibility for the failure of campaigns was placed squarely with the government as it meant that, either the people had not been made to feel the urgency of the message, or that “the leaders have not spoken in a language which the people can understand and respond to.” [Footnote 27] The fact that “three-quarters of the population left school before they were fifteen” [Footnote 28] appeared to have been ignored. Minister of Supply, Herbert Morrison’s simple slogan ‘GO TO IT!’ ( Figure 10 ), echoed in posters, appears to have been far more positively received than “instructions in stiff and incomprehensible language”, [Footnote 29] although there was concern that this campaign would not mean anything once taken out of context of the speech in which it was made, [Footnote 30] a fear that appears to have been justified since ‘What is ‘it’?’ was scrawled upon posters. [Footnote 31]

Lord Ashley argued that posters should be pictorial as

a picture can convey its message more rapidly than words. There are only rare exceptions to this: some two or three words may be so pregnant with meaning that, used alone, they solve the problem better than pictures. Even then, to be really effective, they must be displayed in dramatic, pictorial form. [Footnote 32]

It was suggested that it should be the job of the designer to abstract forms of life to produce a striking and cogent language, such as flags, which would be relevant to the working classes. [Footnote 33] Yet the campaign that succeeded ‘GO TO IT!’, ‘MIGHTIER YET’ (Figure 11), although apparently in accord with these ideas, fell sadly flat under Blitz conditions as it was vaguely reassuring, rather than related specifically to activities in which people were engaged. [Footnote 34] A far more successful design was ‘Firebomb Fritz’ (Figure 12), an animated incendiary bomb with outstretched hands of flame, with an expression that was “comic rather than terrifying”, which was believed to reassure people that firebombs were harmless if dealt with in time. [Footnote 35]

In 1940, Lord Woolton became Minister of Food, and in order to ensure that shoppers played their part in the ‘battle for food’, he decided to change existing Ministry propaganda posters. He criticised ‘Let your shopping save our shipping’ ( Figure 13 ), asking:

What could that mean to any ordinary housewife? She could not repeat it unless she had been very fortunate, or very wise, in the preservation of her teeth. [Footnote 36]

More direct slogans such as ‘Don’t waste bread’ were substituted to attract more popular appeal. Also in 1940, the famous slogan ‘Dig for Victory’ was coined by a London evening paper: prior to that “the Government had promoted food production under the less catchy ‘Grow More Food Campaign’”, [Footnote 37] and within days the image of the foot on the spade became a nationally recognised symbol ( Figure 14 ). [Footnote 38]

In 1941, two gas mask posters came in for criticism from M-O. In Figure 7 it was not clear that the illustration was a gas mask, and although the second half contained the more important message, the red text in the first half meant that it was remembered more. Figure 8 came in for even more criticism, primarily because the best known fact was put first, and consequently people did not bother reading any further. The poster was felt to be too cluttered, with no punch, more in the style of a leaflet, and indeed leaflets containing the same information had only recently been sent out, with a consequence that people felt they had seen it all before. [Footnote 39] The behaviour contained in the pictures was criticised for being casual and un-chivalrous, and the green colouring was felt to indicate a lack of emergency as green is generally perceived to be a safety colour. The Mass-Observationalist felt that there was more of a need for shock propaganda, showing the effects of gas, [Footnote 40] although Fougasse would have argued against this as he felt that people would not look again at a poster which distressed them. [Footnote 41] The timing was also felt to be bad as, after twenty months of war, there were no real worries about gas attacks. [Footnote 42]

In peace, in a democracy, personal interests of citizens tend to come before State interests, but in a time of war, “when the existence of the State and of the individual are equally threatened, the individual interest must be reduced for the temporary benefit of all”, [Footnote 43] although the war “forced the government to make some concessions to retain the allegiance of soldiers, war workers and their families”. [Footnote 44] The Beveridge report of 1942 was regarded by many as a future hope to work towards. Post-war aims were needed as it was recognised that people needed to be fighting for improvements in their own lives, rather than just for the government, although the A.B.C.A. commissioned posters ‘Your Britain, Fight for it now’, both came under fire from Churchill as he did not wish to give people false hopes and expectations.[Footnote 45] Frank Newbould’s poster, (Figure 15) which depicted an idyllic country scene, was criticised as the majority lived in urban areas, although another in the series, by Abram Games’ (Figure 16) was set in an urban background. Games’ poster was criticised by Churchill because he felt that the child pictured with rickets in the background presented an unfair view of life under the Conservatives in recent years.

Commercial posters were felt to be better designed and more colourful, and government posters were not considered to stand out amongst them. [Footnote 46] As the war went on little commercial material was being produced, and so the hoardings were deluged by government material, which although making the government poster more conspicuous, also made the “official message more wearisome because [it was] unrelieved”.[Footnote 47]

Hoarding sites used were those that could be obtained free-of charge, and

for economy reasons should only be fixed at points where there is a considerable amount of pedestrian traffic or large bodies gathered together … and all places where bodies of people are gathered together for special purposes. [Footnote 48]

For some campaigns, such as food, it was felt that posters of hoarding size were suitable only for long term programmes, but smaller sizes were prepared in anticipation and distributed to shopkeepers.[Footnote 49] Posters were produced in a range of different sizes, from small reminders in railway carriages and telephone booths, [Footnote 50] to hoarding size – the message repeated over and over again.

Although it is realised that we have only looked a few government posters, this chapter has given us an idea of the problems that the government faced when producing posters. In the following three chapters we will look at posters linked by three themes, restrictions and influence from foreign powers; the direct appeal; and women portrayed and appealed to in posters.

Footnotes:

1. Memorandum to Lord Davidson and M. Nicholson from M. Cowan, 22/5/40, PRO, INF 1/533
2. Unidentified, 27/3/41, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the IWM (Hereafter, Embleton Collection, IWM)
3. M-O A: Change No. 2, Home Propaganda for The Advertising Services Guild, [1942], p56
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p58
6. M-O A: TC Posters, 3/G, ‘Letter from C.R. Casson to J.R.M. Brumwell :’Tom Harrison’s questions re: posters’, 14/8/41
7. Home Publicity Enquiry Minutes, 04/05/39, PRO, INF 1/300
8. Minutes of meeting held on 13/5/39, of the Home Section of International Propaganda and Broadcasting Enquiry, 16/5/39, p2, Ibid.
9. McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, p31
10. Ibid.
11. Memorandum from A.P. Ryan to the Minister of Information, 4 June 1941, PRO, INF 1/857
12. Ibid.
13. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p22
14. Ibid.
15. J.M. Beable, President of the London Poster Advertising Agency in The Times, September 1939, Embleton Collection, IWM
16. Minutes of meeting of Home Section of International Propaganda and Broadcasting Enquiry, 20/5/39, PRO, INF 1/300, pp1-2
17. Unidentified, 1939, Embleton Collection, IWM
18. Daily Mail, 7/2/40, Ibid.
19. M-O A: FR 2, ‘Government Posters in Wartime’, October 1939
20. Ibid. p3
21. Minutes of meeting held on 13/4/39, of the Home Section of International Propaganda and Broadcasting Enquiry, 24/4/39, PRO, INF 1/300
22. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p31
23. Balfour, M. Propaganda in the War 1939-45, Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany, 1979, p57
24. International Propaganda and Broadcasting Enquiry: Home Section: Official British Publicity Material published during the Great War 1914-1918, 1/6/39, p3, PRO, INF 1/317 (emphasis in original)
25. Minutes of meeting held on 11/5/39, of the Home Section of International Propaganda and Broadcasting Enquiry, 16/5/39, p8, PRO, INF 1/300
26. M-O A: TC Posters, 1/A, 6/10/39.
27. M-O A: Change No. 2, Op. Cit., p5
28. Ibid. p17
29. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p98
30. Letter to Lord Davidson from John Rodgers, 27/05/40, PRO, INF 1/533
31. Mr White, MP, Parliamentary Debates – Official Report, MoI, 3 July 1941, PRO, INF 1/857, p1561
32. M-O A: TC Posters, 1/E, Havinden, A., ‘The Poster, The Public, The Designer, The Advertiser’ in Modern Publicity Yearbook 1939/40, p2
33. Ibid, p3
34. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., pp98-9
35. Advertiser’s Weekly, 11/9/41, p206, Embleton Collection, IWM
36. Davies, J. The Wartime Kitchen and Garden: The Home Front 1939-45, 1993, p35
37. Ibid., p29
38. Advertiser’s Weekly, 8/10/42, p48, Embleton Collection, IWM
39. M-O A: FR 800, ‘Gas mask posters’, 21/07/41, p7
40. Ibid.
41. Fougasse A School of Purposes: Fougasse Posters, 1939-1945, 1946, p38
42. M-O A: FR 800, Op. Cit., p14
43. M-O A: Change No. 2, Op. Cit., p4
44. Stevenson, J. British Society 1914-45, 1984, p457
45. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p182
46. M-O A: FR 2, Op. Cit., pp33-4
47. M-O A: Change No. 2, Op. Cit., p36
48. Memorandum from Mr Galliano, Saward, Baker & Co. to Mr Hornsby, MoI, 19/5/42, PRO, INF 1/344
49. Home Publicity Rationing Campaigns: Government announcement?, 29/10/39, p6, PRO, INF 1/343
50. Advertiser’s Weekly, 10/12/42, p244, Embleton Collection, IWM

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Back to The Administrative Context: The Ministry of Information and Social Surveys
Forward to International Relations

The Administrative Context: The Ministry of Information and Social Surveys

Propaganda was under much closer government control in the Second World War than in the First World War, when there was a variety of “agencies which – constantly merging and splitting – discharged the various functions related to morale, news, censorship and propaganda”. [Footnote 1] Not until 1918 was a Ministry of Information created, under newspaper owner Lord Beaverbrook, to try and instil some order into the chaos, but its chief function appeared to be little more than as a circulator of propaganda to neutral countries, and it was disbanded very soon after the war ended.

In 1935, after recognising the success of Goebbels’ propaganda machine, the MoI was resurrected, but planners were unable to profit from the precedents set in the First World War as records were unable to be found, and one official had to resort to the Encyclopaedia Britannica in order to obtain a definition of ‘propaganda’. [Footnote 2] In the Second World War, the MoI was aiming for an entirely different audience to that of the First, when posters were largely used for recruitment to the armed services, and so such examples were not necessarily helpful anyway. Such posters tended to appeal to values of fair play, good sportsmanship, and a sense of shame in avoidance of duty, rather than to inspire devotion to ideals. Such posters were criticised as being rather drab in colour, short on humour and sex appeal, and with a tendency towards wordiness and over-full explanations. [Footnote 3]

MoI planners were already in full-time government jobs, [Footnote 4] and were therefore unable to devote their full attention to the MoI. [Footnote 5] They included R.W. Leeper, from the News Department of the Foreign Office, who had been very influential in setting up the British Council as a forum for ‘cultural propaganda’. [Footnote 6] The Ministry was disadvantaged as it underwent severe organisational changes, frequent shifts of senior personnel, and a steady erosion of its powers [Footnote 7] in its efforts to imitate existing Whitehall departments of state, although these had evolved pragmatically over time. Civil servants outnumbered public relations and advertising experts, producing an amateurish climate which sprung from the desire by the government to be seen not to be using German methods of propaganda, [Footnote 8] although some saw this as an advantage, producing propagandists with “fresh, open minds”. [Footnote 9]

As a consequence, when war broke out the MoI still had no clear cut objectives; Lord MacMillan, Minister of Information at the time, claimed that:

Not many people feel the urgency and importance of this fourth armament and recognise the severe and practical preparation which its effective use involve. [Footnote 10]

Even Reith, with a media background as director-general of the BBC, when appointed Minister in January, 1940 admitted that he did not know what the purpose of the job was. [Footnote 11] This was possibly because

ample lip service was paid to the importance of propaganda in wartime but behind the scenes… the spirit of scepticism is vocal … hence also the omission to define its functions or to endow it with a recognised authority in its own field. [Footnote 12]

As the war progressed, the government appeared to realise the importance of advertising the war, and it became possible for advertising experts “to obtain exemption from military service on the grounds of work of national importance”. [Footnote 13]

It was not until June 1941, when Churchill instructed all public relations officers to work as a team under the MoI, [Footnote 14] that the object of the Ministry was defined as:

not only the planning of general government information policy, but also the provision of common services for the public relations activities of other departments, who remained directly in control of their own information policy. [Footnote 15]

For instance, if the Ministry of Food wished to dissuade people from using certain foods, they would be required to finance the campaign, but if there was a general campaign against wastage it would be financed by the MoI. [Footnote 16] ‘Government posters’, therefore, cannot be regarded as though they were a singular unit, and conclusions drawn may not be applicable in all cases.

Sir John Reith replaced Lord MacMillan as Minister of Information on 5 January 1940, but was replaced by Duff Cooper on 12 May. It was not until 20 July 1941, when Brendan Bracken became Minister of Information, that the department began to achieve any real recognition.

Bracken possessed everything his predecessors had lacked: excellent press relations, a very close friendship with the Prime Minister, bustling confidence in tackling the Ministry’s adversaries, and a scorn for the exhortation of the British public. [Footnote 17]

Further details about the MoI have already been sufficiently discussed by McLaine. [Footnote 18]

M-O claimed that the government needed to control its channels of information, and develop a better listening-in system. In this first month of the war the Home Publicity section put “out propaganda on a basis of guess-work about effects, symbols, slogans, mass-reaction”, having no means for measuring or studying morale. [Footnote 19]

During the inter-war years, social sciences grew in popularity, with psycho-analysis becoming popular throughout society. The government had an awareness of the need to study the psychology of the masses in order to target their propaganda, although it would not countenance its use in decisions about poster designs [Footnote 20] and the “British Psychological Foundation was roundly rebuffed, although it provided the Ministry with a register of willing, largely Freudian-trained workers”. [Footnote 21] Generally information collected by the government was inaccurate; traditionally ‘public opinion’ had been deduced by studying the content of newspapers, and gauging how popular the opinions expressed in them were by the number of readers of each paper. However, it is very unlikely that many readers read every article, nor agreed with all the opinions expressed in the paper they were reading. During the 1930s two new organisations, which ostensibly made use of more systematic techniques to discover ‘popular’ opinion, were set up; these organisations were the Gallup poll, and M-O. [Footnote 22]

Although the government used the Gallup poll [Footnote 23] to provide statistics about various issues, we are more concerned with M-O as it made specific studies of government posters. M-O was founded in 1937, by Tom Harrisson, an anthropologist; Charles Madge, a poet (also an ‘inactive Communist’); and Humphrey Jennings, a documentary film maker. [Footnote 24] The aims of M-O were to “supply accurate observations of everyday life and real … public moods, an anthropology and a mass documentation” [Footnote 25] about the ‘masses’ whom, it was felt, should have interested the media and politicians more. Some information was gained from a panel of part-time observers, which provided “subjective private opinion”. [Footnote 26] It was felt that “too much attention has been paid in recent years to the method of direct questioning”, [Footnote 27] and emphasis was laid upon “seen behaviour or overheard conversation”. [Footnote 28] During the war, to survive, methods had to be adapted to produce more immediate results, such as a survey about gas mask posters, when visible results, such as an increased number of people wearing gas masks were taken to indicate success. [Footnote 29] (See Figures 7 and 8)

Although M-O was used by the government, as it could investigate a wide range of events at short notice, it was regarded as suspect as it was thought to be ‘on the left’, [Footnote 30] whilst Mary Adams claimed that reliance “on guess-work and partial surveys, or on information lodged by interested bodies can be misleading and dangerous”. [Footnote 31] She argued that there was a need for a continuous flow of regulated information on public thinking in order to formulate publicity measures and test their effectiveness. [Footnote 32] In 1940 it was determined that there was a need to “decide what we want people to do and believe, then to find out what they are thinking and doing now. This calls for the most up to date market research”. [Footnote 33] In consequence, the government set up a Home Intelligence Division of its own to investigate public morale.

The Home Intelligence Division had two distinct functions. The Home Intelligence Unit prepared reports on the morale of the home population, initially daily, later weekly, to be used not only by the MoI in planning its publicity, but also by any other departments. In June 1941, panels of correspondents were recruited to make reports on the state of public opinion in various regions, with action taken upon grievances that were revealed. The Wartime Social Survey was designed to produce regular quantitative results, [Footnote 34] to supplement the qualitative data provided by the Home Intelligence Unit, to make daily reports of facts likely to affect morale, and weekly reports into changes in public opinion and habits. Relevant information was to be sent to other government departments, [Footnote 35] although when asked for their reaction to a test study, [Footnote 36] only the Ministry of Food and Board of Trade had felt that they could make any use of the kind of information that was to be collected, with other ministries claiming that they had no need for the kind of results that would be produced. [Footnote 37]

The development of such an organisation was important as it meant the government had realised that it could not take public feeling and reactions to the war for granted, that it needed to ask the people, not the MPs. Orwell claimed that “the government has done extraordinarily little to preserve morale; it has merely drawn on existing measures of goodwill”, [Footnote 38] but this missed the point that the very fact that the MoI had come to realise that such goodwill existed, and that people were ready to accept restrictions “so long as they were seen as useful to the war effort and equitable in application”. [Footnote 39] Calder, however, claims that the government was not particularly concerned about their relationship with the ordinary people as:

Having found out what people thought and how they behaved, the rulers of the country could manipulate them more efficiently, while simultaneously conforming themselves to the lowest common denominator of public opinion. [Footnote 40]

Bracken felt that the MoI should be dissolved as soon as the war ended, but others felt that there were lessons to learnt from the First World War, when the MoI had disbanded so quickly: “What we learned in the last war, and which our enemies made the most of, we have pooh-poohed and bungled.” [Footnote 41] They felt that it still had much to do, including the re-education of Germany, the presentation of Britain’s case abroad, and the advancement of propaganda techniques through the study of other methods, in order to keep democracy alive. [Footnote 42]

Having explored the organisation that was behind the posters, we now will look at the first posters that it produced, and see if there was anything to be learnt from commercial techniques which had advanced considerably during the 1920s and 1930s

Footnotes:

1. McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, p12
2. Ibid., p14
3. Harper, P. War, Revolution and Peace, Propaganda Posters from the Hoover Institution Archives 1914-1945, [1969], p40
4. See Taylor, P.M. The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939, 1981, p263 for a full list of those on the sub-committee planning the MoI
5. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p14
6. Taylor, P.M. Op. Cit., p266
7. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p3
8. Weight, R. ‘State, Intelligentsia and the Promotion of National Culture in Britain, 1939-45′ in Historical Research Vol. 69, No. 168, February 1996, p85
9. Zemen, Z. Selling the War: Art and Propaganda in World War II, 1978, p20
10. Quoted in McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, p15
11. Ibid., p18
12. Memorandum from A.P. Ryan to the Minister of Information, 4 June 1941, PRO, INF 1/857
13. Begley, G. Keep Mum: Advertising Goes to War, 1975, p16
14. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p252
15. Cantwell, J.D. The Second World War: A Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office, 1993, p114
16. Memorandum from C.C.A. to Mr R.W. Harris, 9/11/39, PRO, INF 1/343
17. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p7
18. See McLaine, I. Op. Cit. for further details on the organisation of the MoI or Lysaght, C.E. Brendan Bracken, 1979 for further details of Bracken’s involvement.
19. M-O A: FR 1, ‘Channels of Publicity’, 11/10/39
20. Stevenson, J. British Society 1914-45, 1984, p429
21. Harper, S. ‘The years of total war: propaganda and entertainment’ in Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Nationalising Femininity: Culture, sexuality and British cinema in the Second World War, 1996, p194
22. Addison, P. The Road to 1945, 1975, p15
23. See Gallup, G.H. The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain 1937-1975 Vol. 1: 1937-1964, 1976 for details of questions asked, and results obtained.
24. Calder, A. and Sheridan, D. Speak for Yourself: A Mass-Observation Anthology 1937-49, 1984, pp4-5
25. Harrisson, T. Living Through the Blitz, 1976, p13 (emphasis in original)
26. M-O A: FR 2, ‘Government Posters in Wartime’, October 1939, p3
27. Ibid. (emphasis in original)
28. Harrisson, T. Op. Cit., p13
29. M-O A: FR 2, Op. Cit., p3
30. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p53
31. Memorandum by Mary Adams, 26/01/40, PRO, INF 1/261
32. Ibid.
33. Memorandum from John Rodgers to John Davidson, 27/05/40, PRO, INF 1/533
34. Letter to Mr Macadam from Mrs Adams, 29/6/40, PRO, INF 1/273
35. Home Intelligence – Decisions taken by Director General, 27/9/40, Ibid.
36. Survey of Public Opinion – Minute Sheet, 13/5/40, Ibid.
37. Wartime Social Survey – Minutes of Meeting, 17/9/40, Ibid
38. Quoted in Pope, R. War and Society in Britain, 1991, p40
39. Ibid..
40. Calder, A .The People’s War 1939-1945, 1969, p471
41. Unidentified, 27/3/41, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the IWM
42. Barmas, J., a letter to Advertiser’s Weekly, undated, Ibid.

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Back to ‘Poster’, ‘Propaganda’ – What do they mean?
Forward to The First Posters

What are ‘propaganda’ and ‘poster’?

If we are to discuss the efficiency of government Home Front propaganda, specifically as regards the posters that the government produced, it is important that we have a clear idea of what is meant by a ‘poster’, and by ‘propaganda’. This chapter will aim to give some idea of the definitions of these words, with reference to how they have been regarded in the past, and since the Second World War, and how this affected attitudes to them.

Propaganda is the attempt to influence opinions and attitudes, or to reinforce existing ideas and beliefs, through suggestion and persuasion, rather than by physical or financial inducement. It “is ethically neutral and it is the values of those using it that make it either good or bad”. [Footnote 1] Nowadays, the word ‘propaganda’ generally holds negative connotations, signifying “a bundle of lies propagated by devious methods and irrational appeals”. [Footnote 2] However, in “its origins ‘propaganda’ is an ancient and honourable word. … It was in later times that the word came to have a selfish, dishonest, or subversive association.” [Footnote 3] Yet even during the war the word ‘propaganda’ held negative connotations in Britain: “Propaganda was something in which the enemy engaged, while one’s own propaganda was regarded as ‘information’ or ‘publicity’.” [Footnote 4] Note that whilst totalitarian Germany had a Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, democratic Britain and America had a Ministry of Information and an Office of War Information respectively, although all appeared to serve basically the same function: the manipulation and control of information that was spread to the public. [Footnote 5]

The ‘poster’ was one means by which such information was spread to the public. Although at first it appears that everyone must know what a poster is, according to Rickards “In the late 1960s the word ‘poster’ was being applied to any single visual presentation printed on a fair-sized sheet of paper” [Footnote 6] and therefore, defining exactly what a poster is is far more difficult:

Firstly… the poster is a separate sheet, affixed to an existing surface (as opposed to those markings and images rendered directly on the surface). Secondly, it must embody a message; a mere decorative image is not enough. Thirdly, it must be publicly displayed. Finally, it must have been multiply produced; a single hand-done notice is not a poster. [Footnote 7]

However, even this definition is not entirely comprehensive: it does not exclude such things as printed notices which cannot really be regarded as posters, nor does it explain what the purpose of a poster may be. Susan Sontag added a further definition: “A public notice aims to inform or command. A poster aims to exhort, to sell, to educate, to convince, to appeal”, [Footnote 8] which although still not an exhaustive definition, as many public displays including government posters, overlap both areas, gives a good working definition.

Official proclamations could perhaps be seen to be the forerunner to posters. Initially, they consisted merely of words, but by the fifteenth century, after Gutenberg’s invention of moveable type, began to include pictures. [Footnote 9] The pictorial element was gradually to change from mere decoration to a major ingredient, until in 1871, in Frederick Walker’s design The Woman in White, the picture became the most important element. As the work of the artist became more and more important, the wording and the image begun to be treated separately, a trend that continued until the 1920s and 1930s.

“By the 1890s designers had learned how to convey messages in a manner that, however complex its aesthetic elements, spoke clearly and was easily understood even from a distance”, [Footnote 10] and the poster became almost a cult object, with serious collectors, and collectors’ magazines. With industrialisation, and mass production, producers fought for bill board space, and plagiarism of designs became rife. With the First World War the poster “turned from selling the comforts of peace to pressing the demands of war”. [Footnote 11] The Germans expressed doubts: “Should an army be raised by the same means as customers for jam?” [Footnote 12] Over the course of the war the poster became an acceptable means of selling, or recruiting for, the war. Although the Germans believed that “British propaganda in World War I… [had] set a new standard for effectiveness”, [Footnote 13] organisation for poster campaigns had been very poor as campaigns were only developed if an idea for one occurred to someone in a government department, and was then approved.

With better communications during the 1920s and 1930s, poster designers had been able to gain ideas from one another, and many graphic techniques had been experimented with and circulated. The ideas of the Constructivist movement were spread from the USSR by El Lissitsky (Figure 2), and by refugees after 1935, when Socialist Realism (Figure 3) became the official art form in the USSR. Constructivism was a movement which had devised photo-montage and experimented with “spatial dynamics, geometric forms and flat, bright colours”. [Footnote 14] Ludwig Hohlwein, a German poster designer, was an important influence upon European poster design, believing that art work should not be merely ‘artistic’, that it was the message that was important, able to be absorbed with the briefest of glances. (Figure 4) [Footnote 15] New ideas were also spread by refugees escaping Nazism, including Moholy-Nagy (Figure 5), who arrived in Britain in 1935, a pioneer of the Bauhaus movement, [Footnote 16] which stressed that the typeface should be regarded as an important and integral part of poster design (Figure 6).

During the war, the aim of ‘propaganda posters’, according to Kenneth Bird, otherwise known as Fougasse, was to overcome three obstacles:

Firstly, a general aversion to reading any notice of any sort; secondly a general disinclination to believe that any notice, even if it was read, can possibly be addressed to oneself; thirdly, a general unwillingness, even so, to remember the message long enough to do anything about it. [Footnote 17]

However, during the war the poster played a lesser role than in the First World War, as, with advances in technology, the radio was seen as a better means for disseminating more immediate information, although many people had lost their radio sets as dealers cancelled H.P. terms, or ran out of battery sets. [Footnote 18] Large numbers of posters were produced, but their use was mainly reserved for long term campaigns as they took a long time to prepare. [Footnote 19] Posters gave information about such subjects as rationing and petrol restrictions, and advice on such subjects as health and diet.

In the 1950s the poster, as defined by Dart, became chiefly an accessory to the television image, and has largely remained so, although for those without access to television size budgets, such as protesters and small companies, the poster has always remained an important medium. Since the 1960s poster reprints have become popular, a category in which we could include the posters reprinted by the IWM, although there were also designs which were specifically made for the reprint market.

We are now bombarded with such quantities of commercial, social and political propaganda, that picture posters today appear to be relatively harmless, through visual media whose persuasiveness and effectiveness make it seem so, [Footnote 20] the poster will probably always be regarded as important as it can take “arguments directly to the man on the street”. [Footnote 21] It is regarded as particularly important for election campaigns, as a poster can express in a nutshell a specific party policy, either complimentary towards one’s own party, or derogatory to an opposing party, for instance “New Labour, Euro Danger”.

Having considered some of the different techniques of, and uses for, posters through history, we will now look at the organisation behind many of the posters produced in the Second World War.

Footnotes:

1. Marshall Cavendish Images of War: The Real Story of World War II Vol. 4, No. 64, 1996, p1767
2. Collier, P.F. Collier’s Encyclopaedia CDRom
3. American Historical Association ‘What is Propaganda?’ (1944) in Boehm, E. Behind Enemy Lines: WWII Allied/Axis Propaganda 1989 p19
4. Marshall Cavendish Op. Cit. p1766
5. See Jowett, G. and O’Donnell, V. Propaganda and Persuasion, 1987 for further details of the methods of propagandists, and what to look for when studying propaganda.
6. Rickards, M. The Rise and Fall of the Poster 1971 p39
7. Adams, Dart ‘Posters of Protest and Revolution’ (1970) Quoted in Rickards, M. The Rise and Fall of the Poster 1971 p7 (emphasis in original)
8. Quoted in Rickards, M. Op. Cit., p8
9. McQuiston, L. Graphic Agitation, 1993, p14
10. Paret, P., Lewis, B.I. and Paret, P. Persuasive Images: Posters of War and Revolution 1992 p2
11. Rickards, M. Op. Cit., p25
12. Ibid., p25
13. Campbell, J. (ed) The Experience of World War II 1989 p196
14. McQuiston, L. Op. Cit., p18
15. Hollis, R. Graphic Design: A Concise History, 1994, p31
16. Ibid., p95
17. Fougasse A School of Purposes: Fougasse Posters, 1939-45, 1946, p11
18. M-O A: FR 1, ‘Channels of Publicity’, 11/10/39
19. Home Publicity: Government Announcement, October 1939, PRO, INF 1/343
20. Harper, P. War, Revolution and Peace, Propaganda Posters from the Hoover Institution Archives 1914-1945, [1969], p5
21. McQuiston, L. Op. Cit., p31

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Back to introduction
Forward to The Administrative Context: The Ministry of Information and Social Surveys

Introduction

In the fifty-two years since the end of the Second World War, modes of historical study have changed greatly. Emphases of study have changed from the study of great men to the study of the ordinary people, and the issues that concerned them. The posters produced during the Second World War are a part of this history.

Visually, they cannot be regarded as great works of art; neither were they intended as such by the artists concerned…. But besides their message they tell us something of the prevailing manners and customs. They also mirror the changing fortunes of the war.[Footnote 1]

We are surrounded by images from the past. Artefacts from the past have

attracted varying responses, ranging from awe to greed, from nostalgia to simple curiosity – or indifference. And sometimes the historian has turned to them when seeking to verify or challenge some legend or fable or well-attested narrative handed down from the past by word of mouth or in written texts. [Footnote 2]

The use of art for historical purposes is important when we consider what it is hoped to gain from the study of posters of the Second World War. In early history artefacts were used as important evidence, yet by the fifteenth century, due to the recovery of much ancient literature, the written word dominated historical sources. Humanist historians were concerned not with evoking the past, but with drawing moral and intellectual lessons from it, and art was left to antiquarians. [Footnote 3]

However, since the last century, the importance of the pictorial sources has increased. It is now accepted that artefacts can be used to broaden the area of study, but in order to make the fullest use of an artefact as a source, it is important for the historian to establish what it is that is being looked at, its authenticity, when and for what purpose it was made, and how it was received. Historians also need to be aware of any circumstances, conventions or constraints that govern representations in art, and the “technical means available for expressing this vision”.[Footnote 4] In wartime, for instance, there was little paper available.

During the last couple of decades the propaganda poster as a souvenir item has become popular, with visitors to the Imperial War Museum (IWM) able to buy reproductions of posters in poster and postcard form, with the range expanding in more recent years. Visitors can now buy reproductions of posters on such items as key-rings, mugs, playing cards and chocolate bars, to name but a few, although in a fairly limited range of designs. It can therefore be seen that there is still a lot of interest in these posters now, and it is suggested that there is something in the images contained in the posters that still has appeal for the British public now, although it is a possible that this will diminish now that the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war is over.

We must not forget “how erratic and potentially misleading a process has been the survival of most visual evidence”. [Footnote 5] Due to the efforts of the IWM and the Public Record Office (PRO) it appears that many examples of Home Front posters have survived. However, there is still an element of selection in those posters that remain on view; the IWM has many more posters in storage than it is possible to display. It was considered important to look at originals of posters, as the effect is very different from that produced by looking solely at postcards. The historian can then gain some idea of how posters looked to contemporaries, although obviously we do not get to see them in their full context, nor the magnificent hoarding size posters.

Posters were centrally produced and distributed and therefore are more reliable as an indicator of government mentality than, for instance, speeches to workers at lunch-times, although believing that the public distrusted ‘official information’ the Ministry of Information (MoI) sought to remain anonymous as far as possible. As a result, most wartime posters remain undated and unsourced, making it almost impossible to follow the development of MoI campaigns through the war, although poster content and newspaper reports give us some clues as to the date of poster campaigns.

The main source for governmental papers is the PRO at Kew. These are important as they give us an understanding of the planning stages, although we must remember that the papers that are stored at the PRO account for only “one per cent of the paperwork created by the state each year”. [Footnote 6] Mass-Observation (M-O) contains a unique collection of qualitative data, providing us with a view of “private opinions which people might be reluctant to express to a pollster”. [Footnote 7] Although its panel of volunteer observers was heavily skewed towards those in the middle classes, and the south-east of England, this is not felt to discredit its findings. [Footnote 8]

For many, the wartime slogans, such as ‘Dig for Victory’, ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ and ‘Coughs and Sneezes Spread Diseases’ blaring at them from every side, from the radio, the big screen, newspapers and hoardings, have never been forgotten, and such slogans have been passed on as a part of our common heritage. Yet, the poster appears to be the most enduring memory that is held, and one would question why. Research into the images contained in Second World War Home Front posters, the decisions that went into the use of these images, and the reception of these images by the British public are important, particularly in relation to the way that the government tried to collect responses and whether they changed their campaigns accordingly.

Posters that were not published or were withdrawn also make for interesting study, particularly for reasons as to why they were rejected, such as whether there were certain images that made such posters offensive. However, there do not seem to be many examples of these, although whether this is because records of unsuccessful designs were not kept or because there were not many anyway, was not established.

There “must be a reasonably fertile field to nourish the propagandist’s seed before it can be expected to ripen into attitudes and opinions”, [Footnote 9] and therefore it is important to understand how the war affected civilians, but many studies have already been done in this area, [Footnote 10] and it is not wished to repeat such information here. We can then understand the meanings behind some of the images used in posters, and understand how, for instance, during particularly bleak periods there was seen to be a need for morale-boosting propaganda. We will look at whether the government felt that propaganda constituted the ‘fourth armament’, and may then be able to understand the way in which the government balanced the use of persuasion and legislation in its campaigns so necessary for the survival of Britain.

In chapter one we will establish a brief, general history of the poster, including advances in graphic techniques and its use in the past. We can then look at how it was actually used in the war, but with particular emphasis upon the extent to which the poster was used in the propaganda ‘battle’ on the ‘Home Front’, both terms which are used today without a thought for how such terms were popularised through wartime propaganda. To avoid anachronisms, we also need to understand that the poster may serve an entirely different purpose now as to that of wartime Britain. Although little reference is made in this study to other propaganda methods, such as newspapers, the cinema, [Footnote 11] and radio, [Footnote 12] posters “generally form part of a larger scheme, and their functions cannot be judged without knowledge of the underlying policy and the plans for the campaign as a whole”. [Footnote 13]

In chapter two we will look briefly at the development and organisation of the MoI, and see to what extent First World War experiences affected both the way that the poster was used in the Second World War, and the use of particular images within posters. We will also see what steps the government took to ensure that its propaganda was appropriate, including the use of sources such as M-O and the Home Intelligence Division.

In chapter three we will see if the government learnt any lessons from the commercial world, and look at the first posters that they produced, generally perceived to be failures, although this is possibly as every historian is reliant upon M-O as the main critical source. [Footnote 14] We will then look at subsequent posters to see if the government appeared to learn any lessons from the criticisms of the first posters.

In Second World War posters there is a conspicuous absence of ‘hate xenophobia’ which was a staple ingredient of First World War posters. In chapter four we see some of the effects of relations between the British government and foreign powers, in particular their attempts to distinguish between ruling ideologies and the general populace. We will look particularly at the impact of Soviet propaganda on British posters.

The best remembered poster from the First World War is the pointing finger of Kitchener (Figure 1); in chapter five, we will see how some posters used this method. We will then look at other techniques by which the direct consequences of their actions were put across to the British public.

Through chapter six we will see the way that women were portrayed, and appealed to, in posters. We will gain an idea of the roles that women were expected to fulfil, in the home and in the services. We will look particularly at the use of glamour in posters, which was used both to appeal to new recruits, and to indicate the dangers of careless talk and the ‘easy woman’. We will also look at two posters that were rejected, and try to understand the reasons for this.

Although several popular relevant histories have been published, [Footnote 15] which are useful to see how various myths about the war are perpetuated, we must be aware of the dangers of using such over-simplified histories. In both popular and academic studies the poster tends to be seen as ancillary to other issues of war, or used simply as an illustration, rather than studied in its own right. Even though there are several books which have been published on the subject of wartime posters, [Footnote 16] it is not one that has been fully explored, and more often posters are studied within a more general book on government propaganda. [Footnote 17] British posters in particular, have been neglected in favour of Nazi propaganda, with no study especially focusing upon what the government believed the people needed to hear, but rather approaching posters as evidence of what the people felt, a gap which this study, concentrating upon British government Home Front posters, will attempt to fill.

Footnotes:

1. Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45 1989 p4
2. Haskell, F. History and its Images: Art and the Interpretation of the Past 1993, p1
3. Ibid., p2
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p3
6. Fowler, S. ‘The Nation’s Memory’ in Martin, A.M. (ed) Despatches: the Magazine of the Friends of the Imperial War Museum, April 1997, p5
7. Bell, P.M.H. John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Politics and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945, 1990, p10
8. Calder, A. and Sheridan, D. Speak for Yourself: A Mass-Observation Anthology 1937-49, 1984, p74
9. American Historical Association ‘What is Propaganda?’ (1944) in Boehm, E. Behind Enemy Lines: WWII Allied/Axis Propaganda 1989 p24
10. Suggested studies include Calder, A .The People’s War 1939-1945, 1969 and Longmate, N. How We Lived Then, 1977
11. For further information on this topic, see Richards, J. and Sheridan, D. (eds) Mass-Observation at the Movies, 1987
12. For further information on this topic, see Briggs, A. The War of Words: A History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom Vol. 3, 1970
13. Advertiser’s Weekly, 8/10/42, p44, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum
14. MO-A: FR 2, ‘Government Posters in Wartime’, October 1939
15. Including Begley, G. Keep Mum: Advertising Goes to War, 1975; Briggs, S. Keep Smiling Through, 1975; Costello, J. Love, Sex and War 1939-1945, 1985; Davies, J. The Wartime Kitchen and Garden: The Home Front 1939-45, 1993; Freeman, R.A. Britain at War, 1990; H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995; INDEX The Spirit of Wartime, 1995 and Marshall Cavendish Collection, ‘Selling the War’ in Images of War No.64, 1996.
16. Including Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989 and Darracott, J. and Loftus, B. (Imperial War Museum) Second World War Posters, 1972
17. Including H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995 and Balfour, M. Propaganda in the War 1939-45, Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany, 1979

If you wish to cite from this page, please use the following citation:

Lewis, R.M., ‘Chapter 1: Introduction, Undergraduate Thesis: The planning, design and reception of British home front propaganda posters of the Second World War’<URL>, written April 1997, accessed Enter Date Here

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Forward to ‘Poster’ and ‘Propaganda’ – What are they?

List of Pictorial Illustrations

Due to a desire by the Ministry of Information (MoI) to remain anonymous information concerning Second World War posters is very scanty, with dates and details of artists rarely available.

Unless otherwise stated, posters are British, and seen/assumed to be the most common size: 20″ x 30″, with reproductions taken from postcards or IWM copies.

Fig.	Title
1	‘Britons [Kitchener] wants YOU’ Date: 1914-1916 Artist: Alfred Leete (1882-1933) Printer: Victoria House Printing Co. Ltd., London Size: 291/2” x 20″ Source: IWM PST 2734
2	‘Klinom Krasnym bei Belykh’ (Beat the Whites with the Red wedge) Origin: U.S.S.R., 1919 Artist: El Lissitsky Source: Lissitsky, K. El Lissitsky, 1968, Plate 40
3	‘Udarnuiu uborku bol’shevistskomu urozhaiu’ (For shock-brigade reaping and for a Bolshevik harvest) Origin: U.S.S.R., 1934 Artist: Maria Voron Size: 41″ x 28″ Source: (Hoover Institution Archives: RU/SU 1611) in Paret, P., Lewis, B.I., and Paret, P. Persuasive Images: Posters of War and Revolution, 1992, p115
4	‘Und Du?’ (And you?) Origin: Germany, 1932 Artist: Ludwig Hohlwein Size: 34″ x24″ Source: (Hoover Institution Archives: GE1694) in Paret, P., Lewis, B.I., and Paret, P. Persuasive Images: Posters of War and Revolution, 1992, p109
5	‘Pneumatik’ Origin: Germany, 1926 Artist: Laszlo Moholy-Nagy Source: Kostelanetz, R. (ed) Moholy-Nagy, 1970, Plate 27
6	Cover for Bauhaus no. 1 Date: 1928 Origin: Germany Artist: Herbert Bayer Source: Willett, J. The Weimar Years: a culture cut short, 1984, p45
7	‘Hitler will send no warning – so always carry your gas mask’ Date: 1941 Printer: J. Weiner Ltd., London Source: IWM PST 0415 (Opie, R. The Wartime Scrapbook: from Blitz to Victory, 1995, p10)
8	‘Gas Attack’ Date: 1941 Printer: Fosh and Cross Ltd., London Source: IWM PST 0136 (MO-A: Poster Inventory)
9	‘Your courage, your cheerfulness, your resolution, will bring us victory’ Date: 1939 Source: IWM PST 0052 (Hunt, J. and Watson, S. Britain and the Two World Wars, 1990, p124)
10	‘Go to it!’ Printer: Perry Colourprint, London Source: IWM PST 0661
11	‘Mightier Yet’ Artist: Harold Pym Printer: Greycaine Ltd, London Source: IWM PST 4086
12	‘Firebomb Fritz’ Printers: Fosh and Cross Ltd., London Source: IWM PST 0199
13	‘Let your shopping help our shipping’ Printer: J. Weiner Ltd., London Size: 10″ x 15″ Source: IWM PST 0708 (Briggs, S. Keep Smiling Through, 1975, p155)
14	‘Dig for Victory’ Printer: J. Weiner Ltd., London Source: IWM PST 0059
15	‘Your Britain, Fight for it now’ Date: 1942 Artist: Frank Newbould (1887-1951) Printer: Adams Bros and Shardlow, Ltd. Size: 197/8” x 293/4“ Source: IWM PST 0069
16	‘Your Britain, Fight for it now’ (Finsbury Health Centre) Date: 1942 Artist: Abram Games Printer: Henry Hildesley Ltd., London Size: 197/8” x 295/16“ Source: IWM PST 2911
17	‘In spite of [Hitler] there’s work to be done Source: Begley, G. Keep Mum: Advertising Goes to War, 1975, p28
18	‘….. but of course it mustn’t go any further!’ Date: 1940 Artist: Fougasse Size: 24″ x 40″ Source: IWM PST 3725 (M-O A: Poster Inventory)
19	‘Nazi War Aims – Grab! Grab!! Grab!!!’ Size: 20″ x 141/2“ Source: IWM PST 8151
20	‘The Red Army’s Fight is Your Fight’ Date: 1941 Source: Freeman, R.A. Britain at War, 1990, p55
21	‘The Moscow Standard’ Source: H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995, p78
22	‘Russia’s Fight is Ours!’ Printer: William Brown and Co. Ltd., London Size: 393/4” x 193/8“ Source: PRO, INF 13/123/19 (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 43)
23	‘Maneater’ Source: IWM PST 0176
24	‘You never know who’s listening!’ Date: 1940 Artist: Fougasse Size: 121/2” x 8″ Source: IWM PST 0142 (Darracott, J. and Loftus, B. (Imperial War Museum) Second World War Posters, 1972, p28)
25	‘WHEN? it’s up to us!’ Date: 1941 Source: Marshall Cavendish Collection, Images of War, 1996
26	‘Women of Britain, arm him’ Printer: Stafford and Co. Ltd., Nottingham Source: IWM PST 3378
27	‘Women of Britain, Come Into the Factories’ Artist: Zec Printer: Lowe and Brydone, London Source: IWM PST 3645
28	‘Cover your hair for safety. Your Russian sister does!’ Printer: Loxley Bros Ltd., London Source: IWM PST 3151 (McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, Plate 10)
29	‘Keep on Saving’ Printer: Chromoworks Ltd., London Size: 591/2” x 393/4“ Source: PRO, NSC 5/139 (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 65)
30	‘Together!’ Date: Passed for publication 22/8/41 Printer: Lowe and Brydone, London Source: IWM PST 3158 and PRO, INF 2/3/277 (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 37)
31	‘Combined Operations Include You’ Artist: Harold Pym Printer: Chromoworks Ltd., London Size: 293/4” x 193/4“ Source: PRO, INF 13/122/21 (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 44)
32	‘Dig on for Victory’ Artist: Peter Fraser Source: PRO, INF 3/96
33	‘Is your journey really necessary?’ Date: 1942-1944 Artist: Bert Thomas Printer: Haycock Press, London Size: 243/4” x 193/4“ Source: IWM PST 0144 and PRO, AN 2/1126
34	‘Deserve Victory’ Publisher: Graham and Gillies Ltd., London Source: IWM PST 3107
35	‘Coughs and sneezes spread diseases’ Date: Early 1942 Artist: H.M. Bateman Printer: Chromoworks Ltd., London Size: 2813/16” x 1911/16“ Source: IWM PST 3429
36	‘Turn this raw material into war material’ Printer: W.E. Berry Ltd., Bradford Source: IWM PST 3757
37	‘Paper, Metal, Bones, Rags and Rubber for Salvage’ Artist: Fougasse Printer: Flemings, Leicester Size: 40″ x 24″ Source: IWM PST 3702
38	‘A few careless words may end in this’ Date: c.1940 Artist: Norman Wilkinson Printer: Greycaine Ltd., Watford and London Size: 20″ x 147/8“ Source: IWM PST 0740 and PRO, INF 13/216/3 (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 20)
39	‘They talked…’ Printer: J. Weiner Ltd., London Size: 91/2” x 14″ Source: IWM PST 0709 (Life, 30/11/40, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum)
40	‘She talked…’ Printer: Fosh and Cross Ltd., London Source: IWM PST 5239 (Life, 30/11/40, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum)
41	‘He talked…’ Source: Life, 30/11/40, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum
42	‘ATS at the wheel’ Artist: Beverley Pick Printer: Field Sons and Co., Bradford Size: 291/4” x 191/4“ Source: IWM PST 4946 and PRO, INF 13/42/8
43	‘Go through your wardrobe’ Artist: Donia Nachshen Printer: W.R. Royle and Sons Ltd., London Size: 293/4” x 193/4“ Source: IWM PST 4773 and PRO, INF 13/144/1
44	‘Join the ATS’ Date: 1941 Artist: Abram Games Printer: Fosh and Cross Ltd, London Size: 283/4” x 191/16“ Source: IWM PST 5207
45	‘YOU are wanted too! Join the A.T.S’ Date: 1941 Source: Sunday Express, 26/10/41 from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum
46	‘Lend a hand on the land at a farming holiday camp’ Artist: Eileen Evans Printer: Chromoworks Ltd., London Source: IWM PST 0143
47	‘Join the Women’s Land Army’ Printer: Fosh and Cross Ltd, London Size: 30″ x 191/2“ Source: PRO, INF 13/140/19 (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 10)
48	‘Careless talk costs lives. Keep mum, She’s not so dumb!’ Artist: G. Lacoste Date: c.1940 Printer: Johnson, Riddle and Co. Size: 147/8” x 97/8“ Source: IWM PST 2817 and PRO, EXT 1/119/20 (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 19)
49	‘Careless talk costs lives. Keep mum – she’s not so dumb’ Size: 143/4” x 93/4“ Source: PRO, EXT 1/119/19 (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 18)
50	‘Careless talk costs lives. Tell nobody – not even her’ Size: 143/4″ x 97/8″ Source: (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 16)
51	‘Careless talk costs lives. Tell nobody – not even her’ Size: 147/8″ x 97/8″ Source: PRO, EXT 1/119/18 (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 17)
52	‘Don’t tell aunty & uncle, or cousin Jane, and certainly not…’ Artist: G. Lacoste Source: IWM PST 3733
53	‘A maiden loved…’ Date: c.1939 Artist: G. Lacoste Source: IWM PST 3417
54	‘The Silent Column’ Source: McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, Plate 3
55	‘Hello boy friend, coming MY way?’ Date: 1943-44 Artist: Reginald Mount Size: 137/8” x 91/4“ Source: IWM PST 0800 (Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989, Plate 35)
56	‘Here comes the bride’ Date: 1942-44 Artist: Reginald Mount Printer: W.R. Royle and Son Ltd. Size: 91/2” x 14″ Source: IWM PST 3417
57	‘Tomorrow’s Citizen’ Printer: Henry Hildesley Ltd., London Size: 91/2” x 14″ Source: IWM PST 3416
58	‘We’re playing one ‘man’ short -and that’s YOU!’ (Rejected design) Source: H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995, between pp44-45
59	‘We’re playing one ‘man’ short -and that’s YOU!’ Source: H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995, between pp44-45
60	‘Be in the fashion – cover your hair’ Artist: Initialled ‘aR’ Printer: Loxley Bros Ltd., London Source: IWM PST 3678
61	‘She’s in the ranks too!’ (Rejected design) Source: H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995, between pp76-77
62	‘Women wanted for evacuation service’ Date: 1939 Artist: Jack Matthew Source: IWM PST 5873
63	‘If only they’d tell us all what to do.’ Date: 1942 Artist: Fougasse Source: Briggs, S. Keep Smiling Through, 1975, p94

If you wish to cite from this page, please use the following citation:

Lewis, R.M., ‘List of Pictorial Illustrations, Undergraduate Thesis: The planning, design and reception of British home front propaganda posters of the Second World War’, <URL>, written April 1997, accessed Enter Date Here

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